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Abstract. I argue that the state of boredom (i.e., the transitory and non-pathological 
experience of boredom) should be understood to be a regulatory psychological state 
that has the capacity to promote our well-being by contributing to personal growth 
and to the construction (or reconstruction) of a meaningful life.   
 
 
1. Boredom: a tale of two constructs 
In recent years, boredom has become the topic of an active interdisciplinary research program. 
What is, at least partly, responsible for this surge of interest in boredom research is the 
development and validation of various ways of conceptualizing and measuring boredom. Two 
such measures focus on job boredom (Grubb, 1975; Lee, 1986), one examines the ability to cope 
with boredom (Hamilton et al., 1984), one assesses leisure or boredom during free time (Iso-
Ahola & Weissinger, 1990; Ragheb & Merydith, 2001), one appraises sexual boredom (Watt & 
Ewing, 1996), one investigates academic boredom (Acee et al., 2010), and yet another considers 
purposelessness, under-stimulation, and boredom in cancer patients (Passik et al., 2003). Despite 
the availability of such measures, most of them are limited in scope: they measure boredom only 
in specific contexts. Two existing measures that are not subject to such a shortcoming are the 
Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS) (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986) and the Boredom Susceptibility 
Scale (ZBS) (Zuckerman, 1979). Out of these two scales, only BPS is a full-scale measure of 
boredom; ZBS is a subscale of the Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, 1979; Zuckerman et al., 
1978). On account of its full-scale character, BPS is to date the most commonly used measure of 
boredom.  
BPS is designed to “assess one’s proneness toward experiencing boredom” and as such it 
is a measure of trait boredom — viz., the propensity to experience boredom frequently and in a 
wide range of situations (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986, p.5). Its use has allowed researchers to study 
the correlates of boredom proneness (i.e., the construct that BPS operationalizes and measures 
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and which is thought to correspond to trait boredom) and to document its profoundly harmful 
effects. For example, boredom proneness has been found to be positively correlated with anger 
and aggression (Gana & Akremi, 1998; Gordon et al., 1997; Mercer-Lynn et al., 2011; Rupp & 
Vodanovich, 1997), depression (Ahmed, 1990; Goldberg et al., 2011; Malkovsky et al., 2012; 
Farmer & Sundberg, 1986), anxiety (Fahlman et al., 2009; Fahlman et al., 2013), hostility (Dahlen 
et al., 2004; Vodanovich et al., 1991), apathy (Goldberg et al., 2011), loneliness (Farmer & 
Sundberg, 1986), and hopelessness (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986). Within an educational context, 
boredom proneness has been linked to poor grades (Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993) and early 
dropout rates (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; Larson & Richards, 1995). Within the workplace, 
boredom has been associated with lower job satisfaction (Abdolahi et al, 2011; Kass et al., 2001) 
and job involvement (Seib & Vodanovich, 1998), increased accident rates (Kass et al., 2010; 
O’Hanlon, 1981; Weinger, 1999), and increased job stress (Wan et al., 2014). In everyday life, 
boredom proneness is related to poor performance on tasks that require sustained attention 
(Malkovsky et al., 2012; Seib & Vodanovich, 1998; Watt & Blanchard, 1994). It is also related to a 
propensity to make mistakes in completing common tasks (Carriere et al., 2008).  
In turn, boredom proneness has been found to lead to poor interpersonal and social 
relationships (Leong & Schneller, 1999; Tolor, 1989; Watt & Vodanovich, 1999). It is also 
associated with a lower life satisfaction (Famer & Sundberg, 1986) and boredom prone 
individuals have a harder time finding meaning in life than those who are not prone to boredom 
(Fahlman et al., 2009; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011; Vodanovich & Watt, 1999; Watt & 
Vodanovich, 1999; Weinstein et al., 1995). What is more, boredom prone individuals experience 
impulse control deficits (Dahlen et al., 2004; Leong & Schneller, 1993). Looking for something to 
excite them, they are more likely to engage in risk-taking behavior, such as reckless driving 
(Dahlen et al., 2005; Kass et al., 2010), and are more prone to binge eating (Stickney & 
Miltenberger, 1999; see also Ganley, 1989), drug and alcohol abuse (Lee et al., 2007; LePera, 
2011; Paulson et al., 1990), and problem gambling (Blaszczynski et al., 1990; Mercer & Eastwood, 
2010).  
 Much of boredom research can thus be seen as an attempt, on the one hand, to 
understand the nature of trait boredom and its correlates and, on the other hand, to explore ways 
in which the effects of trait boredom can be mitigated. Still, not all of boredom research concerns 
itself with trait boredom and it would be a mistake to suggest so. Recently, boredom researchers 
have begun to explore the nature of the state of boredom, a construct distinct from trait boredom. 
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Unlike trait boredom, which is a personality trait, the state of boredom is a transitory, aversive 
experience that signals a failure to engage with one’s environment in a desired manner despite 
one’s desire to do so (e.g., Danckert & Merrifield, 2016; Eastwood et al., 2012). 
An adequate account of the state of boredom—viz., a description of its antecedents, 
effects, experiential profile, and its neurophysiological correlates—turns out to be crucial for our 
understanding of the phenomenon of boredom. First, the idea of the state of boredom is 
conceptually prior to the idea of trait boredom. That is, the actual experience of boredom is 
presupposed both by our notion of trait boredom (after all, trait boredom is a propensity to 
frequently experience boredom) and by the manner in which trait boredom is being measured 
(Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; see also Fahlman et al., 2013). Thus, without an adequate 
understanding of state boredom (to which I will subsequently refer simply by the term 
“boredom”), it is unclear whether we can have a good grasp of the notion of trait boredom. 
Second, as a transitory affective state, boredom appears to be ever-present. It affects both 
healthy individuals and patient populations (Binemma, 2004; Eastwood et al., 2007; Hamilton et 
al., 1984; Newell et al., 2011; Seel & Kreutzer, 2003; Vodanovich, 2003). It affects individuals of 
all genders and from all cultures (see, e.g., Musharbash, 2007; Ng et al., 2015; Sundberg et al., 
1991; Vodanovich et al., 1997; Weinstein et al., 1995). And it is also experienced in a wide range 
of situations (Acee et al., 2010; Belton & Priyadharshini, 2007; Fisher, 1993; Game, 2007; 
Grassian, 2006; Grubb, 1975; Iso-Ahola & Weissinger, 1990; Larson & Richards, 1991). 
Therefore, any attempt to come to terms with our affective existence needs to study and 
understand the state of boredom. 
Third, there is strong evidence in support of the claim that boredom is an emotion (or at 
least, an affective state) in its own right and as such ought to be distinguished from other related 
affective states. For example, Van Tilburg and Igou (2012) found that boredom has a unique 
experiential content (study 1) and that manipulation of the state of boredom did not affect other 
emotional states (anger, sadness, or frustration) (study 4). Furthermore, using structural equation 
modeling, Goldberg and colleagues found that boredom is distinct from apathy, anhedonia, and 
depression—all of which are taken to be phenomenologically akin to boredom (Goldberg et al., 
2011).  
Last, it has been recently proposed that the state of boredom could serve an important 
function in our mental economy. Specifically, it has been suggested that boredom acts as a 
regulatory state that keeps one in line with one’s projects (Bench & Lench, 2013; Elpidorou, 2014 
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and 2015a; Sansone et al., 1992; Smith et al., 2009; Pekrun et al., 2010; Van Tilburg & Igou 2012). 
The state of boredom can motivate one to pursue a new goal when the current goal ceases to be 
satisfactory, attractive, or meaningful. As such, boredom can help to promote the restoration of 
the perception that one's activities are meaningful and congruent with one's overall projects.  
In this paper, my aim is to offer an in-depth and critical examination of boredom’s role as 
a regulatory state and present both its nature and its potentially beneficial effects. Although the 
present article is not the first study to propose a relationship between boredom and self-
regulation, it goes beyond the findings and claims of extant articles in at least two important 
respects. First, it articulates clearly the relationship between the state of boredom and self-
regulation. It does so by emphasizing boredom’s distinctive capacity to move us out of 
uninteresting, unfulfilling, or meaningless situations and relates this capacity to the locomotion 
aspect of the Regulatory Mode Theory (Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000). Second, it 
makes a novel case for the importance of boredom in our lives. Whereas extant studies on 
boredom and self-regulation conclude by defending, proposing, or simply noting a link between 
boredom and self-regulation, the present article takes a further step: it shows how boredom’s 
capacity to keep us in motion is beneficial to our well-being. To put it rather simply and in a 
manner that passes over many of the complexities that will be addressed later on, this article 
makes the following argument: boredom promotes movement; movement is essential to well-
being; ergo, boredom promotes well-being. As agents with projects, goals, and interpersonal 
relationships, we are much better off having the capacity to be bored than lacking it. 
 
2. Caution! 
This article does not argue that our well-being is promoted by the chronic or frequent experience 
of boredom. Nor does it, in any way, suggest that we should strive to be bored. I have already 
presented some of the many detrimental effects (or at least, correlates) of boredom proneness. 
Still, there is value in boredom when it is experienced occasionally by healthy individuals. To see where its 
value lies, it is instructive to draw a parallel between pain and boredom. Although the sensation 
of pain is unpleasant, the capacity to feel pain is good for us. Just consider what happens in cases 
where the capacity to feel pain is missing. Subjects with congenital insensitivity to pain live 
difficult and often short lives. Their lives contain harmful and dangerous stimuli and their bodies 
become injured easily and often severely (Bar-On et al., 2002; Baxter & Olszewski, 1960; 
Nagasako et al., 2010; Swanson, 1963; Thrush, 1973). Yet, they cannot sense harm done to them 
	 5	
and thus cannot protect themselves. Pain is a mechanism that both signals the presence of harm 
and motivates us to change our behavior in order to protect our selves (Eccleston & Crombez, 
1999; Koster et al., 2014; Van Damme et al., 2007). As such, pain is valuable to us. 
 Something similar holds for boredom. Or so this article will show. Boredom protects us 
from certain situations. It does so by informing us of the presence of situations that are not in 
line with our interests and desires, and by motivating us to do something else. If we were to lack 
the capacity to be bored, we would not notice when we are faced with an unsatisfying, non-
stimulating, or monotonous situation. Nor would we do something to get out of it. So, the main 
claim that this article will defend is that boredom (in its non-pathological, state form) is valuable 
to us precisely because its presence helps us to keep moving and in doing so, it brings us closer to 
what is in line with our desires and goals. It is not news to state that there is a place for negative 
emotions and affective states in our well-being (Diener & Seligman, 2002). It is news, however, to 
propose that boredom can be an element of the good life.  
 
3. Describing boredom 
What is state boredom? Here is not the place to provide a systematic and exhaustive review of 
the literature on the state of boredom—others and I have done so elsewhere. Still, in order to be 
in a position to argue for the claim that boredom is a regulatory state that has the potential to 
benefit us I need to present, at least in broad outline, the character of boredom. For ease of 
explication, I follow a component processes account of emotions (e.g., Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 
1991; Scherer, 1984) and hold (a) that emotions consist of a set of interrelated components1 and 
(b) that the task of characterizing a given emotion amounts to that of specifying its different 
components. Thus, in order to describe boredom and to separate it from other related affective 
states, we have to present its affective, cognitive, physiological, and volitional components.2  
 																																																								
1  Most emotions involve an affective component that amounts to the phenomenology or felt 
quality of the emotion; a cognitive component that consists of the effects of the emotional state on 
perceptual and cognitive processes and vice versa; a physiological or somatic component that includes the 
physiological and neurological correlates of the emotional state; an expressive component that consists of 
the associated facial and bodily expressions; and lastly a volitional component that is composed of the 
actions, thoughts, and desires prompted by the presence of the emotion.  2	  In my presentation, I ignore the expressive component of boredom. This is a topic that has 
received very little attention. In one of the few investigations on this topic, Wallbott (1998) reported that 
bored individuals tend to lean their head backwards (i.e., to raise their chin), to collapse their bodies, and 
to restrain from movement.  
	 6	
Affective character: Boredom is an aversive state (Harris, 2000; Hartocollis, 1972; Mikulas & 
Vodanovich, 1993; Pekrun el al., 2010; Todman, 2003). It does not feel good to be bored. Bored 
individuals report feelings of constraint or a perceived lack of agency (Eastwood et al, 2012; 
Fahlman et al., 2011; Fenichel, 1951; Geitwitz, 1986; Hill & Perkins, 1985; Todman, 2013; 
Vodanovich & Kass, 1990a). Furthermore, individuals who find themselves in a state of boredom 
comment both that they feel tired and lethargic and also that they experience feelings of 
restlessness and irritability (Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 2006; O’Brien, 2014).  
 
Cognitive character: It is integral to the experience of boredom that one is both disengaged and 
dissatisfied with one’s environment (Anderson, 2007; Fahlman et al., 2009; Fenichel, 1951; 
Goldberg et al., 2011; Greenson, 1953; Passik et al., 2003). Bored individuals experience 
difficulties in concentrating and maintaining attention (Ahmed, 1990; Hamilton, 1981; Hamilton 
et al., 1984; Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989; Eastwood et al., 2012; Fisher, 1993; Gordon et al., 1997; 
Harris, 2000)3 and they often engage in mind-wandering (Game, 2007; Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 
2006).  
Furthermore, qualitative studies have found that bored individuals experience an altered 
passage of time (Martin et al., 2006): during a state of boredom, time appears to move more 
slowly (Gabriel, 1998; Greenson, 1953; Hartocollis, 1972; Tze et al., 2013; Wangh, 1975). When 
completing a tedious task high boredom prone individuals perceived time as passing more slowly 
than low boredom prone individuals (Watt, 1991). This finding is consistent with a recent study 
by Danckert & Allman (2005) which reports that individuals who are prone to boredom are likely 
to make mistakes in judging the duration of perceptual events.  
Finally, boring situations are ones that are perceived as being non-optimal for the subject 
(Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989; De Chenne, 1988; Mann & Robinson, 2009; Mikulas & 
Vodanovich, 1993). Often subjects report that boring situations are meaningless or trite 
(Barbalet, 1999; Fiske & Maddi, 1961; Perkins & Hall, 1985; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012), that they 
lack a sense of challenge (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012), or even that they 
are too challenging (Daschmann et al. 2011; Goetz et al., 2006; cf. Pattyn et al., 2008). 																																																								3		 Attentional failures seem to be an important mechanism of boredom (Eastwood et al., 2012; cf. 
Leary et al., 1986; Skowronski, 2012). Such a judgment is corroborated by findings that show that 
manipulation of attention can affect the experience of boredom (Damrad-Frye & Laird, 1989). 
Furthermore, it has also been reported that tasks that require sustained attention are often perceived as 
boring (Malkovsky et al., 2012; Pattyn et al., 2008; Scerbo et al., 1992). 
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Physiological character: Currently, there is no agreement as to whether boredom is a state of 
low or high arousal. Indeed, in the literature one finds proposals that describe boredom as a state 
of low arousal (Hebb, 1955; Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993; Russell, 1980), as a state of high 
arousal (Bench and Lench, 2013; Berlyne, 1960; Fisher, 1993; Harris, 2000; Hill & Perkins, 1985; 
London et al., 1972), or even as a state that can be both (Bernstein, 1975; Eastwood et al. 2012; 
Fahlman et al., 2013; Fenichel, 1953; Fiske & Maddi, 1961; O’Brien, 2014; Van Tilburg & Igou, 
2012). Qualitative studies on the phenomenological character of boredom and studies on the 
physiological correlates of boredom are consistent with all three proposals.  
For instance, bored individuals not only describe boredom as a low-energy or apathetic 
state, but also as one that contains feelings of restlessness, anxiety, and irritability (Goetz & 
Frenzel, 2006; Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 2006). Furthermore, boredom has been associated with 
both a decrease and an increase of physiological arousal (Barmack, 1937; Braby et al., 1992; 
Geiwitz, 1966; London et al., 1972; Lundberg et al., 1993; Pattyn et al., 2008). London et al. 
(1972) reported that a boring task can yield an increase in levels of galvanic skin potential (Study 
I) and heart rate (Study II). However, in a different study, Pattyn and colleagues observed that 
during a prolonged target detection task—a task that is often described as boring—participants’ 
heart rate decreased over time (Pattyn et al., 2008; see also Merrifield & Danckert, 2014).  
Although we do not have an adequate picture of the neurological underpinnings of 
boredom, the following findings are noteworthy. First, Oswald (1962) has reported the presence 
of alpha waves during the experience of boredom. This finding relates boredom to mental fatigue 
insofar as studies of the neural correlates of the latter show similar brain activation (Barwick et 
al., 2012; Fan et al., 2015; Lal & Craig, 2002; Phipps-Nelson, et al., 2011; Schier, 2000; Zhao et al., 
2012). Second, there is evidence suggesting that boredom might be correlated with lower beta 
activity in the left Dorso-Lateral Prefrontal Cortex area (DLPFC) (Tabatabaie et al., 2014). Such a 
finding about the neurological correlates of boredom, coupled with the observation that a similar 
activity reduction in DLPFC has been observed in ADHD children (Sangal & Sangal, 2015), 
provides further support for the claim that attention is an important mechanism of boredom 
(Eastwood et al., 2012). Third, Danckert and Merrifield (2016) undertook a comparative study of 
fMRI scans of individuals in three different conditions: during resting state, during boredom 
mood induction, and during a sustained attention task. A comparison of the scans showed that in 
all three conditions there is common activation of components of the default mode network 
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(DMN). Such commonality supports the claim that boredom is similar both to the resting state 
and to the sustained attention task insofar as it is state of disengagement from one’s environment. 
Having said that, Danckert and Merrifield noted that despite similarities, observed brain 
activation in the resting state differs from that of boredom in one important respect: only during 
boredom was there anti-correlated activity in the anterior insular cortex. Danckert and Merrifield 
propose that activity in that region may indicate a failed attempt to engage with the situation and 
in this way, the state of boredom differs from the resting state. Even though both are states of 
disengagement, only the former is one in which individuals were motivated to try to engage with 
their situation.  
 
Volitional character: The state of boredom is marked by a strong desire to engage in a task 
other than the one with which one is currently engaged. A state of boredom is a negative, 
aversive state of discontent. As such, bored individuals wish to be doing something else and will 
try, when it is possible, to escape a boring situation (Bench & Lench, 2013 Berlyne, 1960; De 
Chenne, 1988; Fahlman et al., 2013; Fenichel, 1953; Fiske & Maddi, 1961; Greenson, 1953; Hebb, 
1966; Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993; Todman, 2003; Van Tilburg and Igou, 2012). The 
motivational power of the unpleasantness of boredom is strong. In fact, studies that have found 
that boredom proneness is correlated with risk-taking activities (Dahlen et al., 2005; Kass et al., 
2010) are indications of the ability of boredom to motivate individuals to search for situations 
that will alleviate boredom, even if such situations are harmful to them.  
 
4. Boredom and self-regulation 
Some authors have suggested that boredom should be understood as a self-regulatory state 
(Bench & Lench, 2013; Elpidorou, 2014 and 2015a; Sansone et al., 1992; Smith et al., 2009; 
Pekrun et al., 2010; Struk et al., 2015b; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011 and 2012). Given the summary 
of boredom’s character that I just offered, such a proposal is not only reasonable, but also 
warranted by what we know about the experiential profile of boredom. Boredom is an aversive 
state from which one seeks escape. During boredom one experiences feelings of weariness and 
frustration. One is disengaged from and dissatisfied with one’s situation. The situation does not 
capture the attention of, nor does it interest, the individual. Instead, the individual is moved to 
consider alternative situations, goals, and actions (Bench & Lench, 2013; Elpidorou, 2014 
Fahlman et al., 2013; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). Lastly, through its physiological features—
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increase in arousal and the presence of anti-correlated activity in the anterior insular cortex—
boredom can facilitate the pursuit of alternative goals and situations.  
 A synthesis of the above characteristics of boredom strongly suggests that boredom is 
both an informative and motivational state: it signals that we need to change something about 
ourselves or about our environment and it motivates us to do so. Specifically, what boredom 
does is to promote the pursuit of alternative situations (physical or mental) when the current 
situation ceases to be interesting, engaging, or meaningful. Boredom strives to get us unstuck 
when we find ourselves stuck (Fahlman et al. 2013, p. 68). It moves us out of non-interesting 
situations and into interesting ones. For that reason, boredom is best understood as a regulatory 
state that helps to keep us in line with what we finding interesting and meaningful. Boredom’s 
function is movement, and through movement, it promotes self-regulation. 
 
4.1. Boredom’s relationship to movement and self-regulation  
Self-regulation can be understood to be the set of processes that aim to minimize the discrepancy 
between an individual’s current state and a desired state. Through self-regulatory processes one 
becomes aware of such a discrepancy and utilizes the needed resources in order to achieve the 
desired state (Carver & Scheier 1990; Higgins et al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000; Kuhl, 1985). 
Self-regulation contributes to the completion of goals and allows individuals to act, think, and 
even feel in a way that is consistent with their standards and desires (Baumeister & Vohs, 2003). 
Self-regulation is often hard and requires the exertion of effort (Baumeister et al., 1994) but 
success in self-regulation has been shown to be associated with positive psychological 
adjustment, positive interpersonal relations, lower anger, better grades, and fewer impulse control 
problems (Tangney et al., 2004). Furthermore, in a longitudinal study that followed a cohort of 
1000 children from birth to the age of 32, Moffitt and colleagues (2010) found that poor self-
control in childhood can lead to poor health, financial issues, and even criminal convictions.  
According to Regulatory Mode Theory, a specific model of self-regulation, human 
behavior is guided by two largely independent components: assessment and locomotion (Higgins et 
al., 2003; Kruglanski et al., 2000; Kruglanski et al., 2013). Assessment constitutes the comparative 
aspect of self-regulation (Higgins et al., 2003). It involves the critical evaluation and comparison 
of different entities (e.g., means and goals) in order to determine which one is most worthy of 
pursuing. In contrast, locomotion is the aspect of self-regulation that involves the commitment 
of one’s psychological resources in order to initiate and maintain goal-directed activity 
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(Kruglanski et al., 2000). Locomotion is not characterized by a specific end state but rather by 
movement itself (Higgins et al., 2003; Pierro et al., 2006), where movement is understood to be 
any change from one state (psychological or behavioral) to another (Higgins et al., 2003, p.295).  
A large body of evidence supports the claim that locomotion is a unique construct. For 
example, locomotion is conceptually distinct from promotion (Higgins, 2012; Kruglanski, 2016), 
implementation (Gollwitzer 1990; Scholer & Higgins 2012), and action orientation (Kuhl 1985). 
Furthermore, studies have obtained significant locomotion effects while controlling for the Big 
Five personality factors (Kruglanski et al., 2000; Pierro et al., 2011). Locomotion, just like 
assessment, is a dimension: it varies from low to high, and both individuals or situations can be 
characterized as low or high in locomotion. It is measured by the Regulatory Mode Questionnaire 
(Kruglanski et al., 2000) and can be induced experimentally (Avnet & Higgins 2003; Mauro et al. 
2009). 
There are conceptual reasons to think that the state of boredom and locomotion are 
related. Given its affective, cognitive, volitional, and physiological aspects, boredom is a 
psychological state that has the capacity to help us achieve movement. Boredom not only signals 
a dissatisfaction with our current situation, it also acts as a push that motivates us to get out of 
uninteresting or meaningless situations. As such, the state of boredom contributes to the exercise 
of locomotion. In line with the characterization of movement assumed by Regulatory Mode 
Theory (Kruglanski et al., 2013), the movement that boredom calls for and promotes does not 
have to be physical or behavioral; it can also be mental. That is, in order to alleviate boredom an 
individual might be motivated to change her situation or she might engage in a different mental 
activity, such as mind-wandering (Game, 2007; Harris, 2000; Martin et al., 2006).  
I should be quick to point out that although boredom promotes locomotion, its proposed 
function is not movement pure and simple. Boredom aims not simply to move us from one 
situation to another but to facilitate a type of goal-directed motion—viz., one that takes us from 
an uninteresting or meaningless situation into one that it is interesting or meaningful. Indeed, 
boredom would be incapable of playing an integral role in self-regulation if its aim were not this 
type of goal-directed movement. But why suppose that boredom plays this self-regulatory role by 
promoting goal-directed movement? I offer three reasons.  
First, such a proposal is supported both by phenomenological descriptions of the 
experience of boredom (Fahlman et al., 2013; Harris, 2000; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012) and by 
what we know about the affective, volitional, and cognitive aspects of boredom. Although bored 
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individuals have a strong desire to escape their current situation, they do not simply wish to 
replace their situation with any alternative situation. Clearly, they do not want to move from one 
boring situation to another. Instead, in a state of boredom, one wishes both to stop doing what 
one is currently doing and to engage in a more satisfactory task (Fahlman et al., 2013; Harris, 
2000; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012). The latter aspect of the volitional content of boredom is 
necessary because without a desire to engage in some other task, the experienced state would not 
be one of boredom but perhaps one of apathy. Furthermore, even if the volitional content of 
boredom is not fully specified, it is still “thicker” than a mere “do something else!” That is to say, 
even if bored individuals do not know precisely what they want to do, they do know that they 
want to be doing something that is interesting, exciting, or meaningful (Fahlman et al., 2013).4 On 
account of this volitional content, boredom will motivate individuals to seek out a more fulfilling 
task. 
Second, the proposed function of boredom is consistent with the commonplace 
observation that mere movement is not always capable of alleviating boredom. The act of 
flipping through channels, for example, constitutes both some type of movement and change—at 
the very least, we have changed our immediate sensory environment and we are directing our 
attention to something else. Yet, such a change does not guarantee that boredom will be 
removed. The same holds for certain types of physical movement. Truck drivers driving through 
a monotonous desert road experience boredom (Drory, 1982) despite the fact that they are clearly 
moving and experience some kind of change. If boredom aimed merely to move us, then any 
state of change or movement would be the result of the proper exercise of boredom’s function. 
But such a claim opposes what we seem to know about the function of other (negative) 
emotions. Disgust and fear, for example, dissipate once their function has been fulfilled. More 
importantly, if boredom’s function were simply motion, it would be hard to make sense of 
boredom within a functional account of emotions (e.g., Keltner, Haidt, and Shiota, 2006; Keltner 
& Gross, 1999; Tooby & Cosmides 2008). According to such an account, emotions are solutions 
to problems of physical or social survival. Pure movement, however, does not seem sufficient in 
offering such solutions for complex organisms like us. Or, alternatively, if pure movement is 
capable of solving problems pertaining to physical or social survival, then the need for boredom 
as a distinct affective state becomes hard to discern. Other affective states or physiological states 																																																								
4  I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I discuss in more detail the volitional content 
of boredom. 
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could serve the same function and do so more efficiently.  
Third, the proposed claim about the function of boredom has the additional, theoretical 
benefit that it allows us to make sense of boredom proneness as the result of a dysfunction of the 
state of boredom. Boredom may fail to fulfill its function either because it fails to move us or 
because it moves us into situations that fail to alleviate our boredom—that is, it moves us into 
situations which are not meaningful or interesting to us. In either case, such a failure of 
boredom’s function could lead—if it is systematic—to the more frequent or prolonged 
experience of boredom (i.e., boredom proneness).5  
In making such a claim about the function and dysfunction of boredom, the proposal 
leads to empirically testable predictions. For one, it predicts that lack of movement will be a good 
indicator of boredom proneness—either because one is incapable of moving out of uninteresting 
situations when such situations arise, or because by remaining stuck in the same situation for a 
prolonged period of time, one ceases to be interested in the situation. Additionally, the proposal 
also predicts that having the ability to move from one situation to another will decrease the 
likelihood of being stuck in unsatisfactory situations and consequently decrease the frequency by 
which one experiences boredom. The latter prediction is in fact supported by evidence that 
shows that high locomotion is strongly negatively correlated with boredom proneness (Struk et 
al., 2015b).  
 In turn, it has been shown that high boredom prone individuals are more likely to engage 
in risky behaviors than low boredom prone individuals. Such a finding is prima facie puzzling. If 
high boredom prone individuals tend to engage in risky behavior, shouldn’t then that tendency 
reduce the frequency of their experience of boredom? After all, isn’t risky behavior exciting and 
as such not boring? Unfortunately, this is not an issue that has received sustained attention in the 
literature. Still, the proposed account of the function (and dysfunction) of boredom allows us to 																																																								5		 To be clear, the claim that boredom proneness is the result of a dysfunction of the state of 
boredom does not mean that the mere disposition to experience boredom is dysfunctional. Sometimes the 
disposition to experience boredom can have salutary effects. For example, it can promote escape from an 
unsatisfactory situation (Bench & Lench, 2013; Elpidorou, 2014), help to establish a sense of 
meaningfulness (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2012), or even bolster creativity (Gasper & Middlewood, 2014; 
Mann & Cadman, 2014). At the same time, however, if one is disposed to experience boredom often and 
in a wide range of situations, as this is the case for individuals who score high on BPS, then such a 
disposition will be harmful. Understanding boredom as a functional emotional state that may malfunction 
allows us to make sense of how boredom can be both good and bad for us. I am grateful to an 
anonymous reviewer for helping me see the value of distinguishing between state boredom, boredom 
proneness, and the disposition to experience boredom. 
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make some progress in accounting for it. Boredom functions optimally when it (a) informs us of 
the presence of a boring situation and (b) successfully motivates us to pursue a more interesting, 
fulfilling, or meaningful situation.6 Boredom proneness could thus be the result of a lack of 
motion, but it could also be the result of a failure to properly direct the motivating force of 
boredom. In the case of high boredom prone individuals who engage in risky behavior, it is more 
reasonable to maintain that boredom proneness is the product of the latter type of failure. In 
their attempts to escape boredom, such individuals may rely on what situations most readily 
afford them or on quick fixes of boredom instead of trying to find activities that are in line with 
their personal interests. Engaging in risky activities is the easy solution and one that in all 
likelihood will temporarily assuage one’s feelings of boredom. But if such an activity is not one 
that is in some sense meaningful to the agent and does not promote the agent’s interests, 
boredom will return.  
All in all, we have strong reasons to accept the claim that boredom is a functional 
emotion. Not only is this conclusion supported by what we know about the character of 
boredom —its affective, cognitive, and motivational aspects—but it also carries a number of 
important theoretical advantages. It permits us to account for boredom proneness in terms of the 
function or dysfunction of the state of boredom; it gives rise to empirically testable predictions; 
and lastly, it is in line with functional accounts of emotions. By promoting movement, boredom 
contributes to locomotion. But boredom does more than that. Due to its affective, cognitive, and 
volitional character, boredom can, when it functions optimally, facilitate goal-directed movement 
and moves us closer to what we find interesting and meaningful. 
 
4.2. The limits of boredom 
The fact that boredom can promote the pursuit of more interesting, stimulating, or meaningful 
situations does not render it a psychological panacea. Most emotional states are ones that have 
both beneficial and harmful consequences—fear, for example, protects us from threats and 
dangers, yet it often forecloses opportunities and possibilities for action. Boredom is no 
exception and, in this section, I highlight three potential issues with boredom: i.e., three ways in 																																																								
6  Boredom does not seek merely to promote movement but to contribute to the realization of goal-
directed movement. This aspect of the function of boredom is reflected, I suggested, in its volitional 
character: boredom motivates one to engage in a task that is more stimulating, interesting, or meaningful 
than the current one. Thus, boredom would not be alleviated unless one succeeds in finding and engaging 
with such a task. 
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which boredom may cease to be beneficial to us. I argue, however, that the fact that boredom 
does not always play a salutary role in our lives does not mean that it is not valuable. An 
understanding of the limitations of boredom is not a demonstration of its uselessness, but a 
necessary step in seeing more clearly how boredom can be used optimally and to our own 
advantage.  
 
From boredom to boredom: Boredom, I argued, serves a two-fold function. First, it informs us 
of a mismatch between what we desire and what is being offered to us; in doing so, it signals the 
presence of an unsatisfactory, meaningless, or trite situation. Second, boredom acts as a 
motivational force that helps us to move out of such unsatisfactory, meaningless, or trite 
situations. It should be noted that the very state of boredom does not always carry information of 
what would alleviate our boredom. It is common among bored individuals to have a strong desire 
to do something other than what they are currently doing without however knowing exactly what 
that alternative is (e.g., Fahlman et al., 2013). Still, boredom’s motivational force is not aimless: 
even if boredom itself does not specify what we should be doing, it does motivate us to seek out 
a more interesting or fulfilling task. However, our pursuit for an interesting or fulfilling task need 
not always be successful. In an attempt to escape boredom, it is possible that we find ourselves in 
yet another unsatisfactory, meaningless, or trite situation—one that did not appear to us to be so 
beforehand. Of course, if boredom is successful in promoting movement, then it should motivate 
us once again to do something else and, hopefully, this time we will be more successful in finding 
something that satisfies our need for stimulation and engagement. Having said that, the very 
possibility that boredom may lead to another boring state highlights the need both for self-
knowledge and for knowledge of our possibilities. Motion is good but not when it is purposeless. 
In order to fulfill its potential, boredom needs our guidance. 
 
The interesting isn’t always beneficial: Boredom may be successful in moving us both out of 
unsatisfactory and uninteresting situations and into situations that are perceived by us to be 
interesting, engaging, and stimulating. Nonetheless, the fact that boredom has the ability to do so 
does not guarantee that the new interesting, engaging, or stimulating situation is one that is 
beneficial to us. As it was already discussed, individuals who score high on BPS are more likely 
than low boredom prone individuals to engage in potentially unsafe and dangerous activities 
(Dahlen et al., 2005; Kass et al., 2010). Such risky behavior is exciting but one that may either 
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harm individuals or fail to promote their well-being. 
 
The boring shouldn’t always be avoided:  A subject may experience a situation as boring for a 
variety of reasons. Often, such a reaction is deemed to be appropriate insofar as it correctly 
represents features of the situation. Consider, for example, waiting in line to pay for groceries, 
attending a lecture on a topic that is utterly familiar to us, or having the same conversation over 
and over again. Such situations are not only boring from the perspective of the agent (insofar as 
they fail to stimulate her) but they are appropriately boring: we recognize that these are situations 
in which the agent is not afforded with meaningful or engaging opportunities. However, not all 
situations that are experienced as boring are appropriate in this sense. 
Consider for instance the experience of boredom within an academic context. Students 
often experience boredom when they are attending lectures or when completing challenging 
assignments (Acee et al., 2010; Belton & Priyadharshini, 2007; Mann & Robinson, 2009). In one 
sense, such an experience is a fitting reaction to the situation insofar as the situation is one that 
has failed to engage the subject. In another sense, however, boredom can be said to be an 
inappropriate reaction. Assuming that the class is important for the subject, the experience of 
boredom does not allow the subject to focus on the material, leading potentially to a bad 
outcome. Classes maybe boring, but often they should not.  
If I am correct to emphasize the motivational and aversive character of boredom, the 
onset of boredom will motivate the individual to do something that alleviates the experience of 
boredom. In doing so, boredom could lead to harmful results. If one is bored during class, 
boredom could lead to irrelevant mind-wandering or motivate the individual to engage in an 
activity that is unrelated to the class. While such actions are often employed as means to alleviate 
boredom, they are not the only ones available to the agent. For example, there is some 
preliminary evidence that suggests that boredom can foster creativity (Gasper & Middlewood, 
2014; Mann & Cadman, 2014). Thus, as a response to the experience of boredom, individuals 
could engage in creative thinking about the material at hand or attempt creative or novel 
solutions to questions or exercises. Furthermore, a number of studies have found that boredom 
promotes the reestablishment of a sense of meaningfulness (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011 and 2012). 
Such an attempt to find meaning could allow a student to engage with the material in a different 
way or to discover something that was not immediately evident to her. Lastly, it is important to 
emphasize that the fact that boredom promotes movement does not necessarily entail that 
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boredom will promote movement away from the task at hand. Indeed, even though individuals 
high on locomotion have a preference for multi-tasking, they are capable of remaining focused 
on a given task (Pierro et al., 2011): They can secure sustained attention on a task by moving 
from one state of knowledge or understanding to another while engaging in that task. 
 
Lesson: What do the above limitations tell us about boredom and its value? They underline that 
boredom will not by itself solve our problems. It needs direction and a kind of know-how that 
allows us to use boredom in the right way. In other words, we need to have the ability to know 
how to read the situation and how to respond to it. Thus, listening to what boredom tells us 
when it arises, and being able to use its motivational power in order to promote movement, can 
help not only to reduce the duration of our current boring experience but also to increase the 
chances of later finding ourselves in situations that are congruent with our desires and in line with 
our interests. Such a conclusion might seem to suggest that what is beneficial for us is not 
boredom itself but knowledge about boredom and its uses. Such a reaction underestimates—
severely, I believe—the motivational power of boredom. Boredom is a powerful emotional state 
that can at once disengage us from uninteresting or meaningless situations and move us away 
from them. It has been reported, for example, that individuals who are left alone in a room with 
their thoughts (a situation that is considered to be boring) are willing to shock themselves as a 
way to stimulate themselves and escape the monotony of their situation (Wilson et al., 2014). 
Clearly, on account of its motivational character, boredom differs from apathy and other states of 
disengagement. But it also differs from other related negative states, e.g., frustration. Whereas 
frustration (at least sometimes) can be understood as a call to persist in what we are doing 
(Amsel, 1992), boredom can be understood as a call to switch our activity. Boredom disengages 
us from our current situation, makes salient to us our alternative possibilities, and motivates us to 
do something else. As such, boredom plays a unique and useful role in our mental economy. 
 
5. Boredom and well-being 
So far, I have argued that an important part of boredom’s function is to move us: on account of 
its character, boredom can move us out of uninteresting situations and into ones that are closer 
to our desires, goals, and projects. As such, it can regulate our behavior. But if boredom has the 
capacity to promote motion and in doing so to bring us closer to what can be important, relevant, 
or exciting to us, doesn’t it also, at least sometimes, have the capacity to promote well-being? In 
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this section, I shall argue precisely for that claim. We do not want boredom to arise. We do not 
like it when it does arise. Still, its presence informs us that our current situation is not satisfactory 
to us. More importantly, boredom also offers us an affective force that can motivate us to pursue 
our goals. Hence, boredom can be valuable even if it is unpleasant.  
 
5.1. Beyond happiness 
There is more to living a good life than living a life that is mostly devoid of pain, distress, and 
physical and mental illnesses. Although this point has been acknowledged for decades now 
(Jahoda, 1958; Keyes, 2002; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Singer, 1998), the precise nature of the good life 
still remains a matter of debate (e.g., Ryan and Deci, 2001). If the absence of pain, distress, and 
illnesses is not sufficient for well-being, then what is needed in order for an individual to achieve 
well-being? Current empirical psychology on well-being is divided into two broad camps. On the 
one hand, theorists who espouse a hedonic view of well-being (Kahneman et al., 1999) hold that 
well-being consists in pleasure or happiness (e.g., Diener et al., 1998; Diener, 2000). On the other 
hand, theorists committed to a eudaimonic account of well-being insist that well-being requires 
more than pleasure and happiness: to live well an individual must be capable of realizing one’s 
true potential, or, at the very least, an individual must be capable of exercising certain human 
capacities (e.g., Aristotle, 1925; Fromm, 1981; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Singer, 
1998 and 2000; Waterman, 1993).  
 Ryan and Deci (2001) note that there are findings that suggest that well-being is a 
multidimensional construct and as such includes aspects of both views of well-being (e.g., 
Compton et al., 1996; King & Napa, 1998; McGregor & Little, 1998). For example, King  & 
Napa (1998) surveyed lay people about the character of the good life and found that both happy 
and meaningful lives were desirable. McGregor and Little (1998) conducted factor analyses of a 
number of diverse well-being measures and found two distinct factors—one for happiness and 
one for meaningfulness—suggesting that happiness might be disconnected or independent from 
meaningfulness and that well-being is composed of both.  
 A conceptual investigation into the notion of well-being favors the eudaimonic view. 
That is to say, it supports the claim that even though happiness is an important—perhaps even a 
necessary—component of well-being, it is not sufficient. A vicious and immoral life that is 
nevertheless filled with pleasure and happiness is not a good life. The same goes for a simulated 
life such as a life in the matrix. Although such a life might be infused with positive affect and 
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experiences, it is not a good life (Nozick, 1974). It lacks grounding in reality and it is devoid of 
autonomy, one’s choices and decisions are not one’s own. Whatever else a good life is, it has to 
be a life that is our own.  
 Other theoretical articulations of mental health and well-being also support the 
conclusion that happiness is not the be all and end all of the good life (e.g., Allport, 1961; 
Fromm, 1981; Jahoda, 1958; Keyes, 1998; Rogers, 1961; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995). A good 
life is one that contains not just happiness or positive affects but also the determination and 
pursuit of goals. In living the good life one discovers and exercises one’s talents. One grows as a 
person. One builds his or her social and physical environment. There is no denying that 
happiness is good and beneficial to us (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005; Lyubomirksy & Layous, 2013). 
But happiness is not equivalent to well-being: the latter requires the former (a good life is a happy 
life), but the former does not guarantee the latter (a happy life is not necessarily a good life).  
 
5.2. Boredom and psychological well-being 
In developing their eudaimonic account of well-being, Ryff and Singer articulated six dimensions 
of psychological well-being: positive relations with others, environmental mastery, autonomy, 
personal growth, self-acceptance, and purpose in life (Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Singer, 1998). 
Accordingly, individuals flourish in life when they have trusting and loving relationships with 
others; when they are in the position to shape their environment in order to satisfy their desires 
and accomplish their goals; when they can make their own independent decisions and are 
internally motivated; when they see themselves as developing and growing; when they are 
satisfied with most aspects of themselves; and when they perceive their lives to have meaning, 
coherence, and direction. What such an account makes clear is that living well is a 
multidimensional dynamic process. It involves movement and progress. It involves the taking up 
of interests. It requires the expression and exercise of a number of human capacities. 
 Reflecting on Ryff and Singer’s (1998) psychological well-being account—specifically, on 
personal growth and purpose in life—allows us to see how boredom can contribute towards our 
well-being. According to Ryff and Singer, what it means to flourish is to continue to develop 
one’s potential. A good life is one that is marked by a certain kind of progression: in living such a 
life one gets better (intellectually, socially, and even morally). One grows as a person by realizing 
one’s opportunities and talents and by being open to new experiences and challenges (Ryff, 1989; 
Ryff and Singer, 1998).  
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 The state of boredom can promote personal growth. By moving us out of uninteresting 
situations, boredom motivates us to pursue what we already find interesting (Sansone et al., 1992; 
Smith et al., 2009; van Tilburg & Igou, 2011 and 2012). As such, it can help us to realize and 
practice our talents. By helping us to get unstuck and by promoting movement, boredom can also 
contribute to the development of our projects and to the achievement of our pre-established 
goals. Furthermore, boredom promotes the pursuit of interest, and the experience of interest 
leads to openness to new situations and activities (Cohn et al., 2009; Fredrickson, 2013; cf. Bench 
& Lench, 2013). Being bored is not good in and of itself. It is an aversive experience that signifies 
lack of interest and engagement. Yet precisely because of its aversive nature, boredom can help 
us to get back on track by invigorating interest in one’s projects (Elpidorou, 2014). Although 
boredom itself is a form of stagnation, it can promote movement if we know how, and are able, 
to utilize its potential.  
In addition to contributing to personal growth, boredom can also help in the 
construction of a meaningful life. Individuals with personal projects that are consistent with 
elements of their self-identity report higher levels of meaning than those whose projects are not 
in line with their self-identity (McGregor & Little, 1998). Such coherence and meaningfulness in 
one’s life has been shown to be associated with certain aspects of well-being such as self-
actualization and vitality (Sheldon & Kasser, 1995; Sheldon et al., 1996). Furthermore, a 
meaningful life is not only a consistent or coherent life, but also one that possesses a sense of 
direction or purpose (Ryff, 1989).  
If boredom signals a lack of meaning (Van Tilburg and Igou, 2012) and at the same time 
promotes the pursuit of meaningful activities (Barbalet, 1999; Elpidorou, 2014; Van Tilburg & 
Igou, 2011 and 2012), then boredom can contribute to the buildup of personal meaning. It does 
that not by being itself a meaningful experience, but by providing the agent with information 
about her situation and by motiving her to pursue alternative projects when the current projects 
lose their meaning and significance. Boredom has the capacity to trigger certain self-regulatory 
processes and such processes are capable of causing a change in one’s behavior (e.g., Fahlman et 
al., 2013; Harris, 2000; Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993; Sansone et al., 1992; Smith et al., 2009; cf. 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). Ultimately, the state of boredom can help one to establish or reestablish 
a sense of meaningfulness and coherence, when such a sense is missing (Barbalet, 1999; Van 
Tilburg & Igou, 2011 and 2011).  
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6. Connections and further directions 
Either in passing remarks or in sustained articulations of its nature, boredom figures in the works 
of authors such as Dante, Pascal, Novalis, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Pessoa, 
Heidegger, Russell, and Brodsky. Indeed, discussions of boredom can be traced at least all the 
way back to the writings of early Christian fathers who were concerned with a type of spiritual 
boredom (acedia) responsible for neglecting one’s religious duties. Despite its long and intricate 
history, philosophical and literary discussions of boredom have tended to emphasize its negative 
character. Although not everyone would agree with Kierkegaard’s pronouncement that 
“boredom is the root of all evil,” many have argued that boredom is a problem (Kierkegaard 
1843/1987, p. 285). Understood as a short-lived state, boredom is a burdensome distraction, 
unbecoming of our goal-orientated lives. Understood as a prolonged condition, boredom is an 
existential malaise: a source of unhappiness and an obstacle to the development of one’s 
capacities.7  
By synthesizing recent work from the psychology of boredom, I have offered a 
complementary perspective to predominantly negative articulations of boredom’s character. I 
have argued that through an investigation of the experiential profile of boredom we can begin to 
understand boredom’s function. Specifically, I have suggested that boredom is a self-regulatory 
state capable both of informing us of the presence of an unsatisfactory situation and of pushing 
us out of such a situation and into one that is deemed to be more interesting, meaningful, or 
fulfilling. In this respect, the current article is in agreement with a recent trend in boredom 
literature that takes boredom to be an emotional or affective state that serves a purpose in our 
everyday lives. However, it differs from existing literature in at least two crucial ways. First, the 
present account articulates boredom’s function by relating it to a specific aspect of self-regulation 
(namely, locomotion) and by emphasizing its capacity to move us. Second, it makes a novel case 
for boredom’s value by describing the ways in which the state of boredom can promote aspects 
of eudaimonic well-being. As far as I know, no other work on boredom has suggested that 
boredom can play a role in our well-being. 
Although research on boredom is witnessing a growing popularity, many issues regarding 																																																								
7  The history of boredom does contain some dissenting voices. Most notably, these include Russell 
(1996), Heidegger (1983/2001), and Brodsky (1997). Brief and sometimes enigmatic remarks about the 
value of boredom can also be found in Nietzsche (2001, p. 57), Sontag (2012), Higgins (1981) and in 
novels by D.F. Wallace (The Pale King) and E. Levé (Suicide). Elpidorou (2015b) uses Sartre’s theory of 
emotions to propose a function for boredom.  
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its nature, antecedents and effects remain unresolved. For instance, the neurological and somatic 
correlates of boredom have not been isolated, its connection to mind-wandering, attention, and 
perception of meaningfulness is still explored, and its potential effects on morality is a topic that 
only very recently has received empirical attention (e.g., Elpidorou, 2017; Van Tilburg and Igou, 
2016). There is even disagreement about the factor structure of the BPS (e.g., Melton & 
Schulenberg, 2009; Vodanovich et al., 2005; Struk et al., 2015a). 
Perhaps the most pressing issue within the psychology literature on boredom is the 
question of how to alleviate the harms associated with boredom proneness. The relationship 
between locomotion and the function of boredom as proposed in this article has the potential to 
help. A suggestion that naturally emerges out of the present discussion is that the effects of 
repetitive induction of locomotion on boredom ought to be experimentally investigated (Struk et 
al., 2015b).  Specifically, it is expected that if boredom proneness is low when locomotion is high, 
then the repetitive induction of a locomotion orientation should reduce scores on BPS (Farmer 
& Sundberg, 1986). Such a suggestion is consistent with findings that show that high boredom 
prone individuals are unable to initiate action (e.g., Blunt & Plychyl 1998; Farmer & Sundberg, 
1986; McGiboney & Carter 1988;) and feel stuck in their situations (Fahlman et al., 2013; 
Fenichel, 1951; Todman, 2003). Given boredom’s relationship to attentional difficulties 
(Eastwood et al., 2012), the suggestion is also in line with studies showing that high locomotors 
can stay focused and resist distractions (Pierro et al., 2011). 
 
7. Conclusion: the value of negativity 
There is much discussion about the benefits of positive states (e.g., Cohn et al., 2009; 
Fredrickson, 1998, 2000, and 2001; Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002; Garland et al., 2000; 
Lyubomirsky et al., 2005; Lyubomirksy & Layous, 2013) but very little mention of how negative 
states have the capacity to enhance our lives and help us to flourish. This is unfortunate. To restrict 
our attention to positive states and feelings (e.g., pleasure, joy, interest, hope, trust) would be to 
miss out on the full potential that lies within our rich psychological worlds. States of discontent 
might be unpleasant, but they are powerful, moving, and instructive. 
There is a place for negative emotions in well-being (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001; Diener 
& Seligman 2002). Such an assertion does not mean that we should pursue negative emotions. 
Well-being is not being promoted by the chronic or frequent experience of those negative 
emotions. Still, the ability to have those emotions and the fact that we can react to them in the 
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right way is valuable to us. Negative experiences and emotions are unavoidable. Yet, how we are 
going to react to them depends to a certain extent on us. Articulating boredom’s function allows 
us to discover what it can do for us. And knowing what boredom can do for us is the first step in 





Abdolahi, B., Damirchi, G. V., & Ganjeh, H. (2011). Surveying of job boredom proneness effect on job 
satisfaction and job involvement. Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 3(3), 1332-1338. 
 
Acee, T. W., Kim, H., Kim, H. J., Kim, J., Hsiang-Ning, R. C., Kim, M., Cho, Y., & Wicker, F. W. (2010). 
Academic boredom in under-and over-challenging situations. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 35(1), 17-
27. 
 
Ahmed, S. M. S. (1990). Psychometric properties of the Boredom Proneness Scale. Perceptual and Motor 
Skills, 71, 963-966.  
 
Allport, G. W. (1961). Pattern and growth in personality. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.  
 
Amsel, A. (1992). Frustration theory: An analysis of dispositional learning and memory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Anderson, J. S. (2007). Pleasant, pleasurable, and positive activities. In L. L’Abate (Ed.), Low-cost  
approaches to promote physical and mental health. New York: Springer.  
 
Aristotle (1925). The Nicomachean Ethics (Translated by D. Ross). New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Avnet, T., & Higgins, E. T. (2003). Locomotion, assessment, and regulatory fit: Value transfer from 
“how” to “what.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 525–530. doi:10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00027-1  
 
Barbalet, J.M. (1999). Boredom and social meaning. The British Journal of Sociology, 50(4), 631-646. 
 
Barmack, J. E. (1937). Boredom and other factors in the physiology of mental effort: an exploratory study. 
Archives of Psychology, 31, 9-10. 
 
Bar-On, E., Weigl, D., Parvari, R., Katz, K., Weitz, R., & Steinberg, T. (2002). Congenital insensitivity to 
pain. Orthopaedic Manifestations. Journal of Bone & Joint Surgery, British Volume, 84(2), 252-257. 
 
Barwick, F., Arnett, P., & Slobounov, S. (2012). EEG correlates of fatigue during administration of a 
neuropsychological test battery. Clinical Neurophysiology, 123(2), 278-284. 
 
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than good. Review 
of general psychology, 5(4), 323. 
 
Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice, D. M. (1994). Losing control: How and why people fail at 
self-regulation. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.  
 
Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2003). Self-regulation and the executive function of the self. In M. R. 
Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 197–217). New York, NY: Guilford 
Press.  
 
Baxter, D. W., & Olszewski, J. (1960). Congenital universal insensitivity to pain. Brain, 83(3), 381-393. 
 
Belton, T., & Priyadharshini, E. (2007). Boredom and schooling: a cross‐disciplinary exploration. Cambridge 
Journal of Education, 37(4), 579-595. 
 
	 24	
Bench, S. W., & Lench, H. C. (2013). On the function of boredom. Behavioral Sciences, 3(3), 459-472. 
 
Berlyne, D. E. (1960). Conflict, arousal, and curiosity. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Bernstein, H. E. (1975). Boredom and the ready-made life. Social Research, 42, 512-537.  
 
Blaszczynski, A., McConaghy, N., & Frankova, A. (1990). Boredom proneness in pathological 
gambling. Psychological Reports, 67(1), 35-42. 
 
Blunt, A., & Pychyl, T. A. (1998). Volitional action and inaction in the lives of undergraduate students: 
State orientation, procrastination, and proneness to boredom. Persona l i t y  and Ind iv idua l  Di f f e r ence s ,  
24,  837-846.  
 
Boyle, P. A., Barnes, L. L., Buchman, A. S., & Bennett, D. A. (2009). Purpose in life is associated with 
mortality among community-dwelling older persons. Psychosomatic medicine, 71(5), 574. 
 
Boyle, P. A., Buchman, A. S., Barnes, L. L., & Bennett, D. A. (2010). Effect of a purpose in life on risk of 
incident Alzheimer disease and mild cognitive impairment in community-dwelling older persons. Archives 
of general psychiatry, 67(3), 304-310. 
 
Braby, C. D., Harris, D., & Muir, H. C. (1993). A psychophysiological approach to the assessment of work 
underload. Ergonomics, 36(9), 1035-1042. 
 
Brodsky, J. (1997). On grief and reason: essays. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.  
 
Carriere, J. S., Cheyne, J. A., & Smilek, D. (2008). Everyday attention lapses and memory failures: The 
affective consequences of mindlessness. Consciousness and cognition, 17(3), 835-847. 
 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the self-regulation of behavior. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Cohn, M. A., Fredrickson, B. L., Brown, S. L., Mikels, J. A., & Conway, A. M. (2009). Happiness 
unpacked: positive emotions increase life satisfaction by building resilience. Emotion, 9(3), 361. 
 
Compton, W. C., Smith, M. L., Cornish, K. A., & Qualls, D. L. (1996). Factor structure of mental health 
measures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(2), 406-413. 
 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1975). Beyond boredom and anxiety.  San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Dahlen, E. R, Martin, R. C., Ragan, K., & Kuhlman, M. M. (2004). Boredom proneness in anger and 
aggression: Effects of impulsiveness and sensation seeking. Personality and Individual Differences, 37, 1615-
1627.  
 
Dahlen, E. R., Martin, R. C., Ragan, K., & Kuhlman, M. M. (2005). Driving anger, sensation seeking, 
impulsiveness, and boredom proneness in the prediction of unsafe driving. Accident Analysis & 
Prevention, 37(2), 341-348. 
 
Damrad-Frye, R., & Laird, J. D. (1989). The experience of boredom: The role of the self-perception of 
attention. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 315-320.  
 
Danckert, J. (2013). Descent of the doldrums. Scientific American Mind, 24 (3), 54-59.  
 
	 25	
Danckert, J. A., & Allman, A. A. A. (2005). Time flies when you’re having fun: Temporal estimation and 
the experience of boredom. Brain and cognition,59(3), 236-245. 
 
Danckert, J., & Merrifield, C. (2016). Boredom, sustained attention and the default mode 
network. Experimental brain research, 1-12. 
 
Daschmann, E. C., Goetz, T., & Stupnisky, R. H. (2011). Testing the predictors of boredom at school: 
Development and validation of the precursors to boredom scales. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 
81(3), 421-440. 
 
De Chenne, T. (1988). Boredom as a clinical issue. Psychotherapy, 25, 71-81.  
 
Diener, E. (2000). Subjective well-being: The science of happiness and a proposal for a national 
index. American psychologist, 55(1), 34. 
 
Diener, E., Sapyta, J. J., & Suh, E. (1998). Subjective well-being is essential to wellbeing. Psychological 
Inquiry, 9, 33-37. 
 
Diener, E., & Seligman, M. E. (2002). Very happy people. Psychological science, 13(1), 81-84. 
 
Drory, A. (1982). Boredom proneness---The development and correlates of a new scale. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 50, 4-17.  
 
Eastwood, J. D., Cavaliere, C., Fahlman, S. A., & Eastwood, A. E. (2007). A desire for desires: Boredom 
and its relation to alexithymia. Personality and Individual Differences, 42(6), 1035–1045.  
 
Eastwood, J. D., Frischen, A., Fenske, M. J., & Smilek, D. (2012). The unengaged mind defining boredom 
in terms of attention. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(5), 482-495. 
 
Eccleston, C., & Crombez, G. (1999). Pain demands attention: A cognitive–affective model of the 
interruptive function of pain. Psychological bulletin,125(3), 356. 
 
Elpidorou, A. (2014). The bright side of boredom. Frontiers in Psychology, 5: 1245.  
 
Elpidorou, A. (2015a). The quiet alarm. Aeon Magazine.  
 
Elpidorou, A. (2015b). The significance of boredom: A Sartrean reading. In. D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou, 
& W. Hopp, Philosophy of mind and phenomenology: Conceptual and empirical approaches (pp. 268-283). New York, 
NY: Routledge. 
 
Elpidorou, A. (2017). The moral dimensions of boredom: a call for research. Review of General Psychology, 21 
(1), 30-48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000098	
 
Fahlman, S. A., Mercer-Lynn, K. B., Flora, D. B., & Eastwood, J. D. (2013). Development and validation 
of the multidimensional state boredom scale. Assessment, 20, 68-85. 
 
Fahlman, S. A., Mercer, K. B., Gaskovski, P., Eastwood, A. E., & Eastwood, J. D. (2009). Does a lack of 
life meaning cause boredom? Results from psychometric, longitudinal, and experimental analyses. Journal of 
social and clinical psychology, 28(3), 307-340. 
 
Fan, X., Zhou, Q., Liu, Z., & Xie, F. (2015). Electroencephalogram assessment of mental fatigue in visual 
search. Bio-medical Materials and Engineering, 26(s1), 1455-1463. 
	 26	
 
Farmer, R., & Sundberg, N. D. (1986). Boredom proneness--the development and correlates of a new 
scale. Journal of personality assessment, 50(1), 4-17. 
 
Fenichel, O. (1951). On the psychology of boredom. In D. Rapaport (Ed.), Organization and pathology of 
thought: Selected sources (pp. 349–361). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.  
 
Fisher, C. D. (1993). Boredom at work: A neglected concept. Human Relations, 46, 395– 417 
 
Fiske, D. W., & Maddi, S. R. (1961). Functions of varied experience. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.  
 
Fredrickson, B. L. (1998). What good are positive emotions? Review of General Psychology, 2(3), 300–319.  
 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2000). Cultivating positive emotions to optimize health and well-being. Prevention & 
Treatment, 3(1), 1a. 
 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology. The broaden-and-build 
theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56(3), 218–226.  
 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2013). Positive emotions broaden and build. Advances in experimental social 
psychology, 47(1), 53. 
 
Fredrickson, B. L., & Joiner, T. (2002). Positive emotions trigger upward spirals toward emotional well-
being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(1), 45–55.  
 
Fromm, E. (1981). Primary and secondary process in waking and in altered states of consciousness. Acad. 
Psychol. Bull. 3:29–45  
 
Gabriel, M. (1988). Boredom: Exploration of a developmental perspective. Clinical Social Work Journal, 16, 
156-164  
 
Game, A. M. (2007). Workplace boredom coping: Health, safety, and HR implications. Personnel Review, 36, 
701-721.  
 
Gana, K., & Akremi, M. (1998). L'échelle de Disposition à l'Ennui (EDE): Adaptation française et 
validation du Boredom Proneness Scale (BP).L'année Psychologique, 98(3), 429-450. 
 
Ganley, R. M. (1989). Emotion and eating in obesity: A review of the literature. International Journal of Eating 
Disorders, 8(3), 343-361. 
 
Garland, E. L., Fredrickson, B., Kring, A. M., Johnson, D. P., Meyer, P. S., & Penn, D. L. (2010). Upward 
spirals of positive emotions counter downward spirals of negativity: Insights from the broaden-and-build 
theory and affective neuroscience on the treatment of emotion dysfunctions and deficits in 
psychopathology. Clinical psychology review, 30(7), 849-864. 
 
Gasper, K., & Middlewood, B. L. (2014). Approaching novel thoughts: Understanding why elation and 
boredom promote associative thought more than distress and relaxation. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 52, 50-57. 
 
Geiwitz, P. J. (1966). Structure of boredom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3, 592-600. 
 
	 27	
Goetz, T., & Frenzel, A. C. (2006). Phänomenologie schulischer Langeweile. Zeitschrift für 
Entwicklungspsychologie und Pädagogische Psychologie, 38(4), 149-153. 
 
Goetz, T., Pekrun, R., Hall, N., & Haag, L. (2006). Academic emotions from a social‐cognitive 
perspective: Antecedents and domain specificity of students' affect in the context of Latin 
instruction. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 76(2), 289-308. 
 
Goldberg, Y. K., Eastwood, J. D., LaGuardia, J., & Danckert, J. (2011). Boredom: An emotional 
experience distinct from apathy, anhedonia, or depression. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 30(6), 647. 
 
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1990). Action phases and mind-sets. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), 
Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 53-92). New York, NY: Guilford 
Press 
 
Gordon, A., Wilkinson, R., McGown, A., & Jovanoska, A. (1997). The psychometric properties of the 
Boredom Proneness Scale: An examination of its validity. Psychological Studies, 42, 85-97.  
 
Grassian, S. (2006). Psychiatric effects of solitary confinement. Wash. UJL & Pol'y, 22, 325. 
 
Greenson, R. R. (1953). On boredom. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 1, 7-21.  
 
Grubb, E. A. (1975). Assembly line boredom and individual differences in recreation participation. Journal of Leisure 
Research, 7(4), 256-269. 
 
Hamilton, J.A. (1981). Attention, personality, and the self-regulation of mood: absorbing interest and boredom. 
Progress in Experimental Personality Research 10, 281315.  
 
Hamilton, J. A., Haier, R. J., & Buchsbaum, M. S. (1984). Intrinsic enjoyment and boredom coping scales: 
Validation with personality, evoked potential, and attention measures. Personality and Individual Differences, 5, 
183-193. 
 
Harris, M. B. (2000). Correlates and characteristics of boredom proneness and boredom. Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology, 30, 576–598.  
 
Hartocollis, P. (1972). Time as a dimension of affects. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association, 20, 92–108  
 
Hebb, D. O. (1955). Drives and the CNS (conceptual nervous system). Psychological Review, 62, 243-254.  
 
Hebb, D. O. (1966). A textbook of psychology. Philadelphia: PA: W.B. Saunders.  
 
Heidegger, M. (1983). Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit. Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, (The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, finitude, solitude. Indiana University 
Press, 2001). 
 
Higgins, D. (1981). Boredom and Danger.  In G. Battcock (Ed.), Breaking the Sound Barrier: A critical 
anthology of the new music. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1981. 
 




Higgins, E. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Pierro, A. (2003). Regulatory mode: Locomotion and assessment as 
distinct orientations. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 35, pp. 293– 344). 
New York, NY: Academic Press.  
 
Iso-Ahola, S. E. & Weissinger, E. (1987). Leisure and boredom. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 5, 
356-364.  
 
Jahoda, M. (1958). Current concepts of positive mental health. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Kahneman D., Diener E., & Schwarz N., eds. (1999). Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic  
Psychology. New York: Russell Sage Found.  
 
Kass, S. J., Beede, K. E., & Vodanovich, S. J. (2010). Self-report measures of distractibility as correlates of 
simulated driving performance. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 42(3), 874-880. 
 
Kass, S. J., Vodanovich, S. J., Stanny, C. J., & Taylor, T. M. (2001). Watching the clock: boredom and 
vigilance performance. Perceptual and motor skills, 92, 969-976.  
 
Keltner, D., & Gross, J. J. (1999). Functional accounts of emotions. Cognition & Emotion, 13(5), 467-480. 
 
Keltner, D., Haidt, J., & Shiota, M. N. (2006). Social functionalism and the evolution of 
emotions. Evolution and social psychology, 115-142. 
 
Keyes, C. L. (2002). The mental health continuum: From languishing to flourishing in life. Journal of health 
and social behavior, 207-222. 
 
Keyes, C. L. (1998). Social well-being. Social psychology quarterly, 121-140. 
 
Kierkegaard, S. (1843). Enten-Eller. Et Livs-Fragment, udgivet af Victor Eremita. Kjobenhavn. (Either/Or 
Part I. Tr. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
 
Kim, E. S., Sun, J. K., Park, N., & Peterson, C. (2013). Purpose in life and reduced incidence of stroke in 
older adults: 'The Health and Retirement Study'. Journal of psychosomatic research, 74(5), 427-432. 
 
Koster, E.H., Crombez, G., Van Damme, S., Verschuere, B., De Houwer, J., 2004. Does imminent threat 
capture and hold attention? Emotions 4, 312–317. 
 
Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., & Higgins, T. E. (2013). The distinct psychologies of 
“looking” and “leaping”: Assessment and locomotion as the springs of action. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 7(2), 79-92. 
 
Kruglanski, A. W., Thompson, E. P., Higgins, E. T., Atash, M., Pierro, A., Shah, J. Y., & Spiegel, S. (2000). 
To" do the right thing" or to" just do it": locomotion and assessment as distinct self-regulatory 
imperatives. Journal of personality and social psychology, 79(5), 793-815. 
 
Kuhl, J. (1985). Volitional mediation of cognition-behavior consistency: Self-regulatory processes and 
action versus state orientation. In J. Kuhl & J. Beckman (Eds.), Action control: From cognition to behavior (pp. 
101–128). Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag.  
 
	 29	
Lal, S. K., & Craig, A. (2002). Driver fatigue: electroencephalography and psychological 
assessment. Psychophysiology, 39(3), 313-321. 
 
Larson, R.W., & Richards, M.H. (1991). Boredom in the middle school years: Blaming schools versus 
blaming students. American Journal of Education, 99, 418-443.  
 
Leary, M. R., Rogers, P. A., Canfield, R. W., & Coe, C. (1986). Boredom in interpersonal encounters: 
Antecedents and social implications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 968-975.  
 
Lee, C. M., Neighbors, C., & Woods, B. A. (2007). Marijuana motives: Young adults' reasons for using 
marijuana. Addictive behaviors, 32(7), 1384-1394. 
 
Lee, T.W. (1986). Toward the development and validation of a measure of job measurement. Manhattan 
College Journal of Business, 15, 22-28. 
 
Leong, F. T., & Schneller, G. R. (1993). Boredom proneness: Temperamental and cognitive 
components. Personality and Individual Differences, 14(1), 233-239. 
 
LePera, N. (2011). Relationships between boredom proneness, mindfulness, anxiety, depression, and 
substance use. New School Psychology Bulletin, 8, 15-25.  
 
London, H., Schubert, D. S., & Washburn, D. (1972). Increase of autonomic arousal by boredom. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 80, 29-36.  
 
Lundberg, U., Melin, B., Evans, G. W., & Holmberg, L. (1993). Physiological deactivation after two 
contrasting tasks at a video display terminal: Learning vs. repetitive data entry. Ergonomics, 36, 601–611.  
 
Lyubomirsky, S., King, L., & Diener, E. (2005). The benefits of frequent positive affect: Does happiness 
lead to success? Psychological Bulletin, 131, 803–855. 
 
Lyubomirsky, S., & Layous, K. (2013). How do simple positive activities increase well-being? Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 22(1), 57-62. 
 
Malkovsky, E., Merrifield, C., Goldberg, Y., & Danckert, J. (2012). Exploring the relationship between 
boredom and sustained attention. Experimental Brain Research, 221(1), 59-67. 
 
Mann, S., & Cadman, R. (2014). Does being bored make us more creative?.Creativity Research Journal, 26(2), 
165-173. 
 
Mann, S., & Robinson, A. (2009). Boredom in the lecture theatre: an investigation into the contributors, 
moderators and outcomes of boredom amongst university students. British Educational Research 
Journal, 35(2), 243-258. 
 
Martin, M., Sadlo, G., & Stew, G. (2006). The phenomenon of boredom. Qualitative Research in 
Psychology, 3(3), 193-211. 
 
Mauro, R., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., Higgins, E. T., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2009). The perfect mix: 
Regulatory complementarity and the speed accuracy balance in group performance. Psychological Science, 20, 
681–685.  
 
McGiboney, G. W., & Carter, C. (1988). Boredom proneness and adolescents’ personali-  
ties. Psycho log i ca l  Repor t s ,  63,  395-398.  
	 30	
 
Melton, A. M., & Schulenberg, S. E. (2009). A confirmatory factor analysis of the boredom proneness 
scale. The Journal of psychology, 143(5), 493-508. 
 
Mercer, K. B., & Eastwood, J. D. (2010). Is boredom associated with problem gambling behaviour? It 
depends on what you mean by ‘boredom’. International Gambling Studies, 10(1), 91-104. 
 
Mercer-Lynn, K. B., Flora, D. B., Fahlman, S. A., & Eastwood, J. D. (2011). The measurement of boredom 
differences between existing self-report scales. Assessment, 20(5), 585-596. 
 
Mercer-Lynn, K.B., Hunter, J.A., & Eastwood, J.D. (2013). Is trait boredom redundant? Journal of Social and 
Clinical Psychology, 32(8), 897-916.  
 
Merrifield, C., & Danckert, J. (2014). Characterizing the psychophysiological signature of boredom. 
Experimental Brain Research, 232 (2), 481-491.  
 
Mikulas, W. L., & Vodanovich, S. J. (1993). The essence of boredom. Psychological Record, 43 (1), 3-12.  
 
Moffitt, T. E., Arseneault, L., Belsky, D., Dickson, N., Hancox, R. J., Harrington, H., ... Caspi, A. (2011). 
A gradient of childhood self-control predicts health, wealth, and public safety. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 108(7), 2693–2698  
 
Musharbash, Y. (2007). Boredom, time, and modernity: An example from Aboriginal Australia. American 
Anthropologist, 109(2), 307-317. 
 
Nagasako, E. M., Oaklander, A. L., & Dworkin, R. H. (2003). Congenital insensitivity to pain: an 
update. Pain, 101(3), 213-219. 
 
Newell, S. E., Harries, P., & Ayres, S. (2011). Boredom proneness in a psychiatric inpatient population. 
International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 58(5), 488-495.  
 
Nietzsche, F. (2001). The gay science: With a prelude of rhymes and an appendix of songs. Translated by J. 
Nauckhoff and A. Del Caro and edited by B. Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ng, A. H., Liu, Y., Chen, J. Z., & Eastwood, J. D. (2015). Culture and state boredom: A comparison 
between European Canadians and Chinese.Personality and individual differences, 75, 13-18. 
 
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state and utopia. New York: Basic books. 
 
O'Brien, W. (2014). Boredom. Analysis 74, 236–244. doi: 10.1093/analys/anu041 
 
O’Hanlon. J. F. (1981). Boredom: Practical consequences and a theory. Acta Psychologica, 49, 161-173. 
 
Price, D. D. (1988). Classical and current theories of pain mechanisms. In D. D. Price (Ed.), Psychological 
and neural mechanisms of pain (pp. 212-231). New York: Raven Press 
 
Oswald, I. (1962). The EEG of sleep. In Oswald, I., Sleeping and waking: Physiology and psychology (pp. 35-41). 
Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier, 
 
Passik, S. D., Inman, A., Kirsch, K., Theobald, D., & Dickerson, P. (2003). Initial validation of a scale to 
measure purposelessness, understimulation, and boredom in cancer patients: Toward a redefinition of 
depression in advanced disease. Palliative and Supportive Care, 1, 41-50.  
	 31	
 
Pattyn, N., Neyt, X., Henderickx, D., & Soetens, E. (2008). Psychophysiological investigation of vigilance 
decrement: boredom or cognitive fatigue? Physiology & Behavior, 93(1), 369-378. 
 
Paulson, M. J., Coombs, R. H., & Richardson, M. A. (1990). School performance, academic aspirations, 
and drug use among children and adolescents. Journal of drug education, 20(4), 289-303. 
 
Pekrun, R., Goetz, T., Daniels, L. M., Stupnisky, R. H., & Perry, R. P. (2010). Boredom in achievement 
settings: Exploring control-value antecedents and performance outcomes of a neglected emotion. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 102(3), 531–549  
 
Perkins, R. E., & Hill, A. B. (1985). Cognitive and affective aspects of boredom. The British Psychological 
Society, 76, 221-234.  
 
Phipps‐Nelson, J., Redman, J. R., & Rajaratnam, S. M. (2011). Temporal profile of prolonged, night‐time 
driving performance: breaks from driving temporarily reduce time‐on‐task fatigue but not 
sleepiness. Journal of sleep research, 20(3), 404-415. 
 
Pierro, A., Giacomantonio, M., Pica, G., Kruglanski, A. W., & Higgins, E. T. (2011). On the psychology of 
time in action: regulatory mode orientations and procrastination. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 101(6), 1317-1331. 
 
Pierro, A., Kruglanski, A. W., & Higgins, E. T. (2006). Progress takes work: Effects of the locomotion 
dimension on job involvement, effort investment, and task performance in organizations. Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology, 36, 1723–1743. 
 
Ragheb, M. G., & Merydith, S. P. (2001). Development and validation of a unidimensional scale measuring 
free time boredom. Leisure Studies, 20, 41-59.  
 
Rogers, C. R. (1961). On becoming a person. Boston: Houghton Muffin.  
 
Rupp, D.E., & Vodanovich, S.J. (1997). The role of boredom proneness in self-reported anger and 
aggression. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 20, 41-59.  
 
Russell, B. (1996). The conquest of happiness. New York: W. W Norton & Company Inc. 
 
Russell, J. A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect. Journal of personality and social psychology ,39, 1161-1178. 
 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, 
social development, and well-being. American psychologist, 55(1), 68-78. 
 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2001). On happiness and human potentials: A review of research on hedonic 
and eudaimonic well-being. Annual review of psychology, 52(1), 141-166. 
 
Ryff, C. D. (2013). Psychological well-being revisited: Advances in the science and practice of 
eudaimonia. Psychotherapy and psychosomatics,83(1), 10-28. 
 
Ryff, C. D. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning of psychological well-
being. Journal of personality and social psychology, 57(6), 1069-81. 
 
Ryff, C. D., & Keyes, C. L. (1995). The structure of psychological wellbeing revisited. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 69, 719-727. 
	 32	
 
Ryff C.D., & Singer B. (2000). Interpersonal flourishing: a positive health agenda for the new millennium. 
Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 4,30–44  
 
Ryff, C. D., & Singer, B. (1998). The contours of positive human health. Psychological inquiry, 9(1), 1-28. 
 
Ryff, C. D., Singer, B. H., & Love, G. D. (2004). Positive health: Connecting well-being with 
biology. Philosophical Transactions-Royal Society of London Series B Biological Sciences, 1383-1394. 
 
Sangal, R. B., & Sangal, J. M. (2015). Use of EEG Beta-1 Power and Theta/Beta Ratio Over Broca’s Area 
to confirm Diagnosis of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in Children. Clinical EEG and 
Neuroscience, 46 (3), 177-182. 
 
Sansone, C., Weir, C., Harpster, L., & Morgan, C. (1992). Once a boring task always a boring task? Interest 
as a self-regulatory mechanism. Journal of personality and social psychology, 63(3), 370-390. 
 
Scherer, K .R . (1984). On the nature and function of emotion: A component process approach. In K. 
Scherer & P. Ekman (Eds.), Approaches to emotion. (pp. 293-318). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  
 
Schier, M.A. (2000). Changes in EEG alpha power during simulated driving: a demonstration. Int. J. 
Psychophysiol. 37, 155–162. 
 
Seel, R. T., & Kreutzer, J. S. (2003). Depression assessment after traumatic brain injury: an empirically 
based classification method. Archives of physical medicine and rehabilitation, 84(11), 1621-1628. 
 
Seib, H. M. & Vodanovich, S. J. (1998). Boredom proneness and psychosocial development. The Journal of 
Psychology, 132, 642-652.  
 
Scerbo, M. W., Greenwald, C. Q., & Sawin, D. A. (1992). Vigilance: It's boring, it's difficult, and I can't do 
anything about it. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting (Vol. 36, No. 18, 
pp. 1508-1512). SAGE Publications. 
 
Scholer, A. A., & Higgins, E. T. (2012). Commitment to change from locomotion motivation during 
deliberation. Motivation and Emotion, 36, 114-129. doi:10.1007/s11031-011-9239-4 
 
Sheldon, K. M., & Kasser, T. (1995). Coherence and congruence: Two aspects of personality integration. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 531-543.  
 
Sheldon, K. M., Ryan, R., & Reis, H. T. (1996). What makes for a good day? Competence and autonomy in the day 
and in the person. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 1270-1279 
 
Skowronski, M. (2012). When the bored behave badly (or exceptionally). Personnel Review, 41, 143-159.  
 
Smith, J. L., Wagaman, J., & Handley, I. M. (2009). Keeping it dull or making it fun: Task variation as a 
function of promotion versus prevention focus.Motivation and Emotion, 33(2), 150-160. 
 
Sontag, S. (2012). As consciousness is harnessed to flesh: Journals and notebooks, 1964-1980. Edited by D. Rieff. 
New York: Farrar Straus Giroux. 
 
Struk, A. A., Carriere, J. S. A., Cheyne, J. A., & Danckert, J. (2015a). A short Boredom Proneness Scale: 




Struk, A. A., Scholer, A. A., & Danckert, J. (2015b). A self-regulatory approach to understanding boredom 
proneness. Cognition and Emotion, 1-14. 
 
Stickney, M. I., & Miltenberger, R. G. (1999). Evaluating direct and indirect measures for the functional 
assessment of binge eating. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 26(2), 195-204. 
 
Sundberg, N. D., Latkin, C. A., Farmer, R. F., & Saoud, J. (1991). Boredom in young adults gender and 
cultural comparisons. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 22(2), 209-223 
 
Swanson, A. G. (1963). Congenital insensitivity to pain with anhydrosis: a unique syndrome in two male 
siblings. Archives of neurology, 8(3), 299. 
 
Tabatabaie, A. F., Azadehfar, M. R., Mirian, N., Noroozian, M., Yoonessi, A., & Yoonessi, A. (2014). 
Neural Correlates of Boredom in Music Perception.Basic and Clinical Neuroscience, 5(4), 259-266. 
 
Tangney, J. P., Baumeister, R. F., & Boone, A. L. (2004). High self- control predicts good adjustment, less 
pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success. Journal of Personality, 72 (2), 271–324.  
 
Thrush, D.C. (1973). Congenital insensitivity to pain: A clinical, genetic and neurophysiological study of 
four children from the same family. Brain, 96, 369-386. 
 
Todman, M. (2003). Boredom and psychotic disorders: Cognitive and motivational issues. Psychiatry, 66, 
146-167.  
 
Todman, M. (2013). The dimensions of state boredom: Frequency, duration, unpleasantness, 
consequences and causal attributions. Educational Research International, 1(1), 32–40.  
 
Tolor, A. (1989). Boredom as related to alienation, assertiveness, internal-external expectancy, and sleep 
patterns. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 45, 260-265. 
 
Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (2008) The evolutionary psychology of the emotions and their relationship to 
internal regulatory variables. In M. Lewis & J.M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.). Handbook of emotions.3rd ed. 
(pp.103-129). New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Tze, V. M. C., Daniels, L. M., Klassen, R. M., & Johnson, C.-H. L. (2013). Canadian and Chinese 
university students’ approaches to coping with academic boredom. Learning and Individual Differences, 23, 32-
43.  
 
Van Damme, S., Crombez, G., Lorenz, J., 2007. Pain draws visual attention to its location: experimental 
evidence for a threat-related bias. Journal of Pain 8, 976–982 
 
van Tilburg, W. A., & Igou, E. R. (2011). On boredom and social identity: A pragmatic meaning-
regulation approach. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 1679-1691. 
 
van Tilburg, W. A., & Igou, E. R. (2012). On boredom: Lack of challenge and meaning as distinct 
boredom experiences. Motivation and Emotion, 36(2), 181-194. 
 
Van Tilburg, W. A., & Igou, E. R. (2016). Can boredom help? Increased prosocial intentions in response 
to boredom. Self and Identity, 1-15. 
 
	 34	
Vodanovich, S. J., Verner, K. M., & Gillbride, T. V. (1991). Boredom proneness: Its relationship to 
positive and negative affect. Psychological Reports, 69, 1139-1146.  
 
Vodanovich, S. J., Wallace, J. C., & Kass, S. J. (2005). A confirmatory approach to the factor structure of 
the Boredom Proneness Scale: Evidence for a two-factor short form. Journal of Personality Assessment, 85, 
295-303.  
 
Vodanovich, S. J. & Watt, J. D (2015). Self-Report Measures of Boredom: An Updated Review of the 
Literature. The Journal of Psychology, 150(2), 196-228. DOI: 10.1080/00223980.2015.1074531  
 
Vodanovich, S. J. & Watt, J. D (1999). The relationship between time structure and boredom proneness: 
An investigation within two cultures. The Journal of Social Psychology, 139, 143-152.  
 
Vodanovich, S. J., Watt, J. D., & Piotrowski, C. (1997). Boredom proneness in African-American college 
students: A factor analytic perspective. Education, 118(2), 229-236. 
 
Vodanovich, S. J. (2003). Psychometric measures of boredom: A review of the literature. The Journal of 
psychology, 137(6), 569-595. 
 
Vogel-Walcutt, J. J., Fiorella, L., Carper, T., & Schatz, S. (2012). The definition, assessment, and mitigation 
of state boredom within educational settings: A comprehensive review. Educational Psychology Review, 24(1), 
89-111. 
 
Wallbott, H. G. (1998). Bodily expression of emotion. European Journal of Psychology, 28, 879–896.  
 
Wan, H. C., Downey, L. A., & Stough, C. (2014). Understanding non-work presenteeism: Relationships 
between emotional intelligence, boredom, procrastination and job stress. Personality and Individual Differences, 
65, 86-90.  
 
Wangh, M. (1975). Boredom in psychoanalytic perspective. Sociological Research, 42, 538-550.  
 
Waterman, A. S. (1993). Two conceptions of happiness: Contrasts of personal expressiveness 
(eudaimonia) and hedonic enjoyment. Journal of personality and social psychology, 64(4), 678-691. 
 
Watt, J. D., & Blanchard, M. J. (1994). Boredom proneness and the need for cognition. Journal of research in 
personality, 28, 44-51.  
 
Watt, J.D., & Ewing, J. E. (1996). Toward the development and validation of a measure of sexual 
boredom Journal of Sex Research, 33, 57-66.  
 
Watt, J.D., & Vodanovich, S. J. (1999). Boredom proneness and psychosocial development. The Journal of 
Psychology, 133, 303-314. 
 
Weinger, M. B. (1999). Vigilance, boredom, and sleepiness. Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis, 9, 69-
91. 
 
Weinstein, L., Xie, X., & Cleanthous, C. C. (1995). Purpose in life, boredom, and volunteerism in a group 
of retirees. Psychological Reports, 76(2), 482-482. 
 
Wilson TD, Reinhard DA, Westgate EC, Gilbert DT, Ellerbeck N, Hahn C, Brown CL, Shaked A. (2014) 
Social psychology. Just think: the challenges of the disengaged mind. Science 345:75–77  
 
	 35	
Zhao, C., Zhao, M., Liu, J., & Zheng, C. (2012). Electroencephalogram and electrocardiograph assessment 
of mental fatigue in a driving simulator. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 45, 83-90. 
 
Zuckerman, M. (1979). Sensation seeking: beyond the optimal level of arousal. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  
 
Zuckerman, M., Eysenck, S., & Eysenck, H. J. (1978). Sensation seeking in England and America: Cross-
cultural, age, and sex comparisons. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 139-149.  
 
 
